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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARY J. REHN, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CHARLES C. REHN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
Case No. 970700-CA 
Priority 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant Charles C. Rehn has appealed a Decree of Divorce entered by the Third 
District Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: The trial court failed to make the necessary findings for the amount 
and length of its alimony award; for its deviation from the child support guidelines; 
and for its award of attorney's fees. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Any award of property, alimony, child support, and 
attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court and such an award will not 
be disturbed unless the trial court's findings amounted to an abuse of discretion. Boyle 
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v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987); Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974); see 
also Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986) (relating the standard to an award of 
alimony); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989) (relating the 
standard to an award of attorney's fees). 
ISSUE 2: The trial court erred in excluding Charles Rehn's witness regarding 
Mary Rehn's underemployment and income potential. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Trial courts are given broad discretion in managing 
their cases, and the Utah Court of Appeals will not interfere with that management unless 
it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R. Co., 
Inc., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah App. 1992); citing Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 
1980). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are set forth in full in 
Addendum A attached to this Brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1993) 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1997) 
Utah R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4) (1987) 
Utah R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) (1987) 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-502 (1996) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce of a long-term marriage, the Divorce Decree signed by the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, in Summit County, Utah, and entered in the 
Court's records on September 26, 1997. 
The parties were married on August 27,1977, and at the time of trial on August 14, 
1997, had been married nearly 20 years. (Tr. 2, 10, 124). 
There were two (2) children born of the marriage: Kyle, d.o.b. 3/11/88, who was 
nine years old at the time of trial; and, Shawn, d.o.b. 3/12/91, who was six years old at the 
time of trial. (Tr. 12-13). 
The facts were uncontroverted that Mary Rehn was the primary caretaker of the 
minor children, and had structured her employment around the children's school and 
activities. In fact, Mary had gone so far as to work all holidays, weekends and evenings 
when Charles Rehn was present to care for the children, so as to help the family with child 
care payments. (Tr. 14-18, 22, 36, 39-43, 121-122). 
The parties had established their marriage as Mary being the in-home caretaker of 
the children and Charles the outside wage earner. (Tr. 46-47, 121-122, 125). 
At the time of trial, Charles was earning $82,000 a year, which constituted 
approximately 80 percent of the family income and $6833 per month gross. (Tr. 63-74, 
121). 
Mary, through a series of part-time jobs, earned $17,154 for the year prior to trial, 
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which was approximately 20 percent of the family income, and resulted in a gross monthly 
income of $1429. (Tr. 63, 121). 
Child support was set by the parties by Stipulation in the amount of $1045 to be 
paid by Charles to Mary. This amount was confirmed in the Findings and Decree, and a 
child support schedule was attached as an exhibit to those documents. (Tr. 5, 63-64, 122, 
Findings of Fact, T[ 18-19, Decree of Divorce, ]f 5). 
Alimony was ordered by the Court to be paid by Charles to Mary in the amount of 
$1200. Charles' total financial obligation to Mary for child support and alimony was 
$2245, approximately 33 percent of his gross monthly income. (Tr. 125). 
Since the trial, Charles has entered an Appeal contesting the Court's Orders 
concerning the amount and length of alimony, the alleged deviation from child support 
guidelines, the award of attorney's fees to Mary from Charles, and alleges the Court erred 
in excluding Charles' expert witness. 
SUMMARY OF THE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 
For his first issue on appeal, Charles Rehn argues, basically, that every financial 
element of the trial court's findings and order was an abuse of discretion. Mr. Rehn 
argues that the award alimony, the amount of child support, the division of the parties 
debts, and the award of attorneys fees were all an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
The essence of Mr. Rehn's argument is that the trial court failed to make sufficient 
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findings to support these awards. In response, Ms. Rehn first argues that to the degree 
these arguments raise factual issues already resolved by, and within, the sound discretion 
of the trial court, they should not be relitigated at the appellate court level. To the degree 
these arguments legitimately address an abuse of discretion by the trial court, Ms. Rehn 
argues that the trial court made sufficient findings to support these awards. Judge Brian, 
perhaps anticipating the likelihood of appeal, carefully reviewed the evidence presented 
by both parties, and then made a series of detailed findings regarding the expenses of the 
parties, the need of assistance by Ms. Rehn and her children, and the ability of Mr. Rehn 
to assist and provide for these expenses. In responding to Mr. Rehn's arguments, Ms. 
Rehn argues that there were sufficient findings to support the award and, therefore, no 
abuse of discretion occurred. 
For his second issue, Charles Rehn argues that the trial court erred in excluding a 
'Vocational" expert from testifying at trial. Ms. Rehn respectfully argues, in response, that 
there is no law, judicial or statutory, that allows an attorney to give notice to opposing 
counsel that he is supplementing his witness list to include a new expert one day before 
trial. This is particularly the case where the attorney admits that it was his responsibility 
to obtain the expert witness and he failed to do so, simply because the parties were trying 
to settle the case. Ms. Rehn will argue that the trial court acted within its discretion, and 
within the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, 
in excluding the expert witness. 
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ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1: The trial court failed to make the necessary findings for the amount 
and length of its alimony award; for its deviation from the child support guidelines; 
and for its award of attorney's fees. 
A. Award of Alimony. 
Charles Rehn, in his appeal, attacks the Third District Court's award of permanent 
alimony to Mary Rehn in the amount of $1200 per month. Courts have long recognized 
that the purpose of such support is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as 
possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Paffel v. Paffel 732 P.2d 96, 
100 (Utah 1986). In a divorce action, the trial court has considerable discretion in 
awarding alimony and, on appeal, this discretion will not be disturbed "absent a showing 
of a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion." Paffel 732 P.2d at 100; Rashband v. 
Rashband, 725 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is an abuse of discretion not to consider: 
(1) the financial condition and the needs of the spouse requesting alimony, (2) the ability 
of the spouse seeking alimony to provide sufficient income for him or herself, and (3) the 
ability of payor spouse to provide that support for the requesting spouse. Paffel 732 P.2d 
at 100-101. However, "so long as the record is clear that the trial court has considered 
these three factors, we will not disturb its determination regarding alimony unless it has 
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clearly abused its discretion." Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 
App. 1992). Judge Brian, in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, found that the 
parties had been married 20 years and, therefore, alimony was appropriate. (Findings, [^ 
30). In reviewing the financial condition and needs of Mary Rehn, Judge Brian referred 
to Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, which sets out — in detail — Ms. Rehn's monthly expenses. 
(Findings, f 32). The Court then found these expenses reasonable and real, and that the 
needs of Ms. Rehn and her two children were approximately $3300 per month. (Findings, 
f 7,32-33). The Court further noted that $3300 per month in expenses is not unreasonable 
for a mother and two children, particularly when the expenses associated with the children 
would increase as the children grew in age. (Findings, Tf 7). 
In reviewing the ability of Ms. Rehn to provide income for herself and her two 
children, Judge Brian found that Ms. Rehn has been willing to provide for herself and her 
family. Specifically, he found that she has worked weekends and holidays to provide for 
her family (Findings, % 11), and she has earned, while working as industriously as 
possible, $1072 per month in income from her various jobs. (Findings, j^ 34). The Court 
further noted that the emphasis of the parties has been to ensure that the children were 
I 
properly cared for by their mother (Findings, f^ 16), that Ms. Rehn had historically been 
the primary caretaker of the children (Findings, f^ 14), and that despite that: 
[she] has scrounged for multiple jobs, some of them perhaps less dignified and 
less rewarding financially and otherwise than she would have liked to have, 
but nevertheless, she has bent her back and gone to work. 
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(Findings, Tf 12). Therefore, the Court concluded, there is "no issue of unemployment or 
underemployment based on the historical roles Plaintiff and Defendant have assumed in 
this marriage." (Findings, f^ 13). 
In considering Charles Rehn's ability to provide alimony for Mary Rehn, Judge 
Brian noted that Ms. Rehn had a clear need for assistance and Mr. Rehn had a clear ability 
to pay alimony. (Findings, ^ 37). Specifically, where Charles Rehn earns $6833 gross 
income per month and Mary Rehn earns $1428 gross income per month (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 2), the Court noted that the ratio of earned income earned between the parties is 
approximately 80% for Charles Rehn and 20% for Mary Rehn (Findings, <[j 9). The Court 
went on to note that "[historically, and as far as the court can see into the future, the 
ability to earn income definitely favors Defendant." (Findings, ^ 13). Finally, the Court 
recognized that, because of its order, "the parties are going to have to tighten their belts 
and make do with less." (Findings, Tf 20). 
Appellee respectfully argues that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
clearly indicate that Judge Brian gave weight to and considered the facts relating to each 
of the three factors required by PaffeL The issue then remaining is whether this 
consideration amounted to a clear abuse of discretion. Judge Brian considered the income 
of both parties and the relationship that these incomes bore one to each other. He 
considered the monthly expenses of Mary Rehn and her children, and Ms. Rehn's efforts 
and ability to provide for herself and her family. He considered the parties' expenses and 
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the ability of Charles Rehn to pay alimony. In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife 
alimony because: 
Wife submitted documents reflecting her changing circumstances as she 
moved from a family household to a single household. In addition, she 
testified at trial that her stated needs amounted to $2272.58 per month. . . . 
[T]he court awarded Wife $800 per month alimony, imputed an earning ability 
of $1000 per month and awarded her a portion of Husband's military retainer 
amounting to $589 per month. Thus, the court's award contemplated that Wife 
would receive a monthly income of $2389. That figure is close to Wife's 
stated monthly need of $2272.58. In view of the trial court's equitable 
distribution of the marital assets and debts, Wife's uncontroverted testimony 
regarding her projected needs and past standard of living, and Husband's 
ability to pay, we conclude that the court considered the necessary factors. 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah App. 1994); see also Rosenbahl v. 
Rosenbahl 876 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah App. 1994). 
On appeal, Charles Rehn argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing 
to resolve factual discrepancies between Ms. Rehn's testimony and her estimated expenses 
as set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 2. The trial court, in exercising its discretion, gave 
weight to Ms. Rehn's expenses as set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 and found they were 
reasonable for a mother with two children. Furthermore, Mr. Rehn argues that the trial 
court making no findings as to Mr. Rehn's expenses or his ability to pay alimony. Mr. 
Rehn argues that his monthly income of $6833 per month is insufficient to pay the $2245 
per month in child and spousal support ordered by the trial court, such support being only 
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33% of his current gross income.1 The trial court did, in again exercising its discretion, 
find that Mr. Rehn's gross monthly income was four times that of Ms. Rehn, and that he 
has the ability to pay the support ordered.2 
Hill v. Hill [869 P.2d 963, (Utah App. 1994)] addressed the issue of what 
constituted adequate findings of a spouse's ability to pay alimony. Mr. Hill argued that 
the court did not make the requisite findings on his ability to provide alimony for his ex-
wife. Hill 869 P.2d at 966. He argued that based upon his salary of $1100 per month, a 
child support award of $600 per month and an alimony award of $100 per month was an 
abuse of discretion because it was simply more than he could afford to pay. Ibid. In 
affirming the award of alimony, the appellate court noted that: 
Mrs. Hill concedes that the court did not make an express finding on Mr. Hill's 
ability to pay, but notes that the court fully considered this factor at trial. Mr. 
Hill provided the court with documentation concerning his present and 
historical earnings, along with his current expenses. . . .[The alimony] 
determination was therefore reasonable, given the remainder of the court's 
orders regarding the parties' financial obligations and the court did not abuse 
its discretion in making this determination. 
1
 This Court should note that because of favorable tax treatment afforded the payor of 
alimony payments, Mr. Rehn in this case, a payment of $1,200 for alimony or spousal support 
equates to an $800 to $900 in out of pocket payment, as the other $300 to $400 would be lost to 
the payor to taxes regardless of the alimony award. 
2
 Appellee notes that while Judge Brian, in his findings, referred specifically to his review 
of the parties exhibits (which would include both parties' monthly expenses), he did not list the 
monthly budget for each of the parties as a specific finding. Appellee knows of no case requiring 
a trial court to make explicit findings regarding the month expenses of the parties in determining 
whether alimony should be awarded. 
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Ibid. Mr Rehn was given the opportunity to and did submit a list of his monthly expenses 
to the trial court. Judge Brian, in his findings, noted that "the parties are simply going to 
have to tighten up their belts and make do with less." (Findings, Tf 20). It is clear from 
this statement he considered the expenses of both parties, and the impact of his decision 
on these expenses, in making his award of alimony. 
Finally, Charles Rehn argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding there 
was no issue of underemployment, and in not using Mary Rehn's historical earnings to 
impute an income higher than that attributed to her. (Appellant's Brief 13-15). It is 
settled law that a trial court may but is not required to impute a higher income to a party 
where their historical earnings have been significantly higher and where the party clearly 
has the capacity to find employment consistent with their historical earnings. Westenskow 
v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1977). Furthermore, Utah courts have historically 
recognized that, where the mother's time is needed at home to provide adequate care and 
nurturing for the parties' minor children, it is not necessary to impute full-time 
employment income or even any income at all. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218,1123 
(Utah 1980); Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1992). In Fletcher, the court 
noted: 
The record in the case will sustain the alimony award as an appropriate sum 
for support and maintenance. Plaintiff introduced into evidence a budget 
indicating family needs... . Her income was limited by part-time employment 
so she might give adequate care and nurturing to the three younger children, 
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ranging in age from four to eight. Defendant had sufficient income to provide 
support. The record sustains trial court's finding that the sum awarded for 
alimony was reasonable. 
Fletcher, 615 P.2d at 1123. In addition, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that an award 
of $2000 per month in alimony was not an abuse of discretion despite the trial court's 
failure to impute income to the wife. Watson, 837 P.2d at 3. The trial court had found 
that there was an "agreement by the parties that [Mrs. Watson] would not work outside the 
home but would remain in the home to care for the parties' minor child." Ibid. Based on 
that finding, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to "decline to impute any 
income to the plaintiff, at least until the child is in school on a full time basis." Ibid. 
In the present case, Judge Brian found that Mary Rehn has been the primary 
caretaker for the parties' minor children. (Findings, ]f 14, 38; Tr. 122). Furthermore, he 
found that "the emphasis of the parties has been properly placed in making sure that the 
children have been properly cared for my their mother." (Findings, \ 16; Tr. 122). 
Finally, he noted the age of the children, that "the youngest is just barely entering into the 
first grade." (Findings, ^ j 15). It is clear from the findings of Judge Brian that he properly 
considered the factors set forth in Paffel, and in considering those factors, also properly 
considered the necessary and important role that Ms. Rehn will have to play as mother of 
12 
the parties' children.3 
Charles Rehn, in appealing the issue of alimony — as well as the various other 
issues that he has raised on appeal — raises a plethora of factual issues for the Court of 
Appeals' consideration. However, on appeal of these issues, Mr. Rehn is limited to 
arguing abuse of discretion and is not allowed to relitigate factual issues within the 
discretion of the trial court. In 1997 the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the long standing 
principal that alimony issues "are within the sound discretion of the trial court because 
of its advantaged position to assess evidence and ascertain facts." Willey v. Willey, 951 
P.2d 226 (Utah 1997); citing to Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978). 
Furthermore, the Court noted that, while the Court of Appeals reviews these 
determinations for abuse of discretion, "considerable deference [should be granted] to the 
trial court due to its familiarity with the facts and the evidence." Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 
(Utah 1997), citing to Paffel v. Pqffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah App. 1986). 
While Ms. Rehn recognizes the Court of Appeals' responsibility to review these 
cases for an abuse of discretion by the trial court, she respectfully argues that these factual 
issues raised by Charles Rehn were thoughtfully considered by Judge Brian before making 
3
 Another issue regarding Ms. Rehn's employability ~ and one which Mr. Rehn on appeal 
has carefully chosen to ignore — is the physical and psychological damage associated with an 
acoustic neurinoma tumor which, when discovered in 1984, had grown into her brain stem. The 
tumor was surgically removed but resulted in a loss of hearing in her left ear and a loss of nerve 
control in the muscles associated with her mouth. This issue is set forth in detail at Tr. 23-25. 
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his findings. To ask the appellate court to reconsider factual issues such as Ms. Rehn's 
employment history or Mr. Rehn's income and expenses, after Judge Brian has already 
considered these issues and made specific findings relating to them, seeks to invade that 
province of factual determination rightfully left to the trial court. The findings clearly 
indicate that Judge Brian carefully considered the three factors in Paffel, that he 
articulated specific findings relative to those three factors, and then issued an award of 
alimony consistent with Ms. Rehn's needs and Mr. Rehn's ability to pay. 
For these reasons set forth above, there was clearly no abuse of discretion in 
awarding alimony in this case; therefore, Mr. Rehn's request that the matter be reversed 
and remanded back to the trial court should be denied. 
B. Permanent Alimony 
Charles Rehn also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in awarding alimony 
beyond the duration of the parties marriage. Mr. Rehn argues that, pursuant to the 
language in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h),4 a specific finding by the court that 
extenuating circumstances exists is necessary before an award of permanent alimony is 
made. Judge Brian, in awarding alimony, noted that: 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (1997) provides: 
Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that 
the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, the 
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a 
longer period of time. 
14 
alimony has been carefully considered factoring in the length of the marriage, 
disparity in the abilities of the parties to earn income, the historical roles of 
both parties have played in this family during the 20-year marriage, the age of 
the little children who are the primary responsibility of the Plaintiff, and all 
other pertinent facts. 
(Findings, Tf 38). It is clear from that statement that the circumstances of the marriage, 
including the duration of the marriage, were fully considered by the court before it 
awarded alimony. 
In Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992), Mr. Watson argued that the 
trial court erred in awarding permanent alimony to his ex-wife. Using the same abuse of 
discretion standard which the court of appeals applies to all alimony reviews, the court 
affirmed an award of $2,000 per month in alimony for two years, and for $1,500 per 
month thereafter, until "the plaintiff remarries, dies or cohabits as defined by statute, or 
until further order of the court." Watson, 837 P.2d at 3. The court of appeals held that the 
trial court did not abuse it's discretion by basing its award "upon [Mr. Watson's] ability 
to earn, and the needs of [Mrs. Watson]." Ibid. In the present case, the findings clearly 
demonstrate that Judge Brian considered the 20 year duration of the marriage, Ms. Rehn's 
work history and her need to care for and nurture her children, Mr. Rehn's earning 
capacity and history, and his projected earning capacity. Therefore, Ms. Rehn respectfully 
argues that an award of permanent alimony in this case, when considered in light of the 
trial court's findings, was appropriate and not an abuse of discretion. 
15 
C. Child Support 
Charles Rehn alleges that the Court made insufficient findings for a deviation from 
the child support guidelines. However, Charles Rehn fails to mention that the child 
support schedule used by the parties was agreed to prior to the trial and presented to the 
Court as a Stipulation. Furthermore, the actual child support shedule, to which Mr. Rehn 
now objects, was entered into evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, without any objection by 
opposing counsel. (Tr. 63-64). Therefore, the only Findings that the Court needed, or 
actually made, related to the Stipulation of the parties that child support would be in the 
amount of $1045. (Tr. 5 andTr. 122). 
Additionally, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce 
relayed the same information concerning child support, including the child support 
schedule attached as an exhibit to both documents. These documents were mailed to, and 
approved as to form by, Charles Rehn's counsel and returned to Mary Rehn's counsel 
prior to filing with the Court. If there was a problem with the stipulated amount of child 
support, that was the time for Charles Rehn to bring his objection. However, nothing was 
relayed to Mary's counsel, and no objection was entered either to the Findings, the Decree, 
or the child support schedule attached to those documents. 
Evidently, Charles Rehn does not like the benefit of his bargain at this late date, 
and so chooses to now place the blame for the child support amount at the feet of the trial 
judge alleging insufficient and improper Findings. 
16 
D. Debt Allocation 
In attacking the trial court's allocation of marital debt between the parties, Charles 
Rehn again seeks to raise factual issues generally considered within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. Mr. Rehn, again, argues that there was insufficient findings to support 
the division of martial debt. As is noted above, Judge Brian found that, based upon the 
four to one ration in income favorable to Mr. Rehn, he should bear the substantial portion 
of the marital debt. (Findings, If 8-9, 17, 22). 
It is a settled issue of law, as noted above, that an appellate court will not disturb 
the property and debt distribution of the trial court in a divorce action unless a clear abuse 
of discretion is shown. Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 670 (Utah App. 1987); citing to 
Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974). In such a case, the trial court is clearly in the 
best position to weigh the evidence, determine credibility and arrive at factual conclusions. 
Boyley 735 P.2d at 670. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has held that it was not an 
abuse of discretion for one party to end up with 87% of the marital debt. Hill v. Hill 869 
P.2d 963, 966 (Utah App. 1994). 
As has been note above, the trial court in this case carefully reviewed the evidence 
before it and entered findings based upon the needs of Ms. Rehn and her children, her 
ability to support her family and contribute to any marital debt, and Mr. Rehn's ability to 
provide assistance in paying such debt. Ms. Rehn respectfully argues that the trial court's 
findings sufficiently indicate a careful review and consideration of the evidence before the 
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court and, therefore, the distribution of debt was not the result of an abuse of discretion. 
E. Attorney's Fees 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1993) grants trial courts the power to award attorney 
fees in divorce cases. It is settled law that when a trial court enters an award of attorney's 
fees pursuant to § 30-3-3, it "must be based on evidence of the financial need of the 
receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees." Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App.1991). Such an award, 
including the amount, is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 
P.2d 1380, 1385 (Utah 1980). On appeal, the award will not be disturbed the finding 
unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 
(Utah App. 1989). Failure to make adequate findings to explain the award constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. 
The findings clearly indicate that the Court addressed Ms. Rehn's need of 
assistance with her attorney's fees, Mr. Rehn's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of 
the fees. As noted above, Judge Brian, in deciding the financial issues relating to the 
divorce decree, found that a ratio of 80%, attributable to Charles Rehn, and 20%, 
attributable to Mary Rehn, was appropriate in light of the evidence of the parties incomes. 
(Findings, If 9, 17). The Court went on to find that Mary Rehn had incurred $8,600 in 
legal fees and costs (Findings, Tf 25), that these fees were necessarily incurred by Ms. Rehn 
in securing a divorce, that work accomplished was reasonable in terms of time and scope, 
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that the charge per hour was appropriate, and that these rates were normal based upon 
attorney's with similar experience and expertise. (Findings, f 27). Continuing, the Court 
found that "Plaintiff has need for assistance with her attorney's fees and Defendant has 
the ability to pay." (Findings, f 26). In determining the award of attorney fees, Judge 
Brian applied the 80% to 20% ratio that he used in deciding the financial issues of this 
case, and awarded Ms. Rehn attorney's fees in the amount of $6,880. (Findings, ^ 28). 
On appeal, Charles Rehn argues that there were insufficient findings by the trial 
court to demonstrate a need by Ms. Rehn to have assistance in paying her fees. He argues 
"Mary's attorney fee award is unsupported by any factual finding of need or of Charles' 
(sic) [ability to pay?]." (Appellant's Brief, p. 23). However, the findings indicate that 
court considered the financial situation of both parties, their incomes, and Ms. Rehn's 
ability to meet her and her children's obligations. 
Therefore, for these reasons, Judge Brian did not abuse his discretion in awarding 
attorney's fees in this case, and therefore Mr. Rehn's request that the matter be reversed 
and remanded back to the trial court should be denied. 
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ISSUE 2: The trial court erred in excluding Charles Rehn's witness 
regarding Mary Rehn's underemployment and income potential. 
Factual Background Relating to Issue 2. 
Appellant maintains in his brief that he informed Mr. Cathcart by fax two days 
before trial that he intended to call a vocational expert whom he had just retained. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 23). The fax received in Mr. Cathcart's office indicates that it was 
actually faxed at 17:49 (5:49 p.m.) on August 12, 1997, two days before trial. (See 
Addendum B). The trial record shows that Mr. Cathcart actually received the fax sent by 
Mr. Christensen at 7:30 a.m the day before trial. (Tr. 80-81). This is the first notice Mr. 
Cathcart received that this witness was going to be called at the trial. (Tr. 80, 83). 
Interrogatories had been served on, and answered by, Mr. Christensen and he made no 
mention of any 'Vocational expert" or any expert witness of this nature. (Tr. 83). These 
answers had been signed by Mr. Rehn less than two months prior to trial. While Charles 
Rehn argues that the "vocational" expert was disclosed as soon as he was located and 
retained (Appellant's Brief, p. 23), it should be noted that the matter had been pending 
before the trial court for over seventeen months. Furthermore, the issue to which the 
expert would testify — namely, Mary Rehn's earning potential relative to alimony — was 
an issue that was before the Court and before counsel from the day that Plaintiffs 
Complaint was originally filed on March 18th and served on March 21st of 1996. Mr. 
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Christensen's only explanation for his failure to disclose or retain the witness earlier was 
"we have made four or five attempts to settle this case" (Tr. 81), and in the end he 
admitted "the failure to get the witness was my own responsibility." (Tr. 81). 
The trial court, in two different scheduling orders, one dated July 3, 1997, and the 
other dated July 16, 1997, ordered that all discovery (including responses to discovery) 
and all exhibits and witness lists to completed and exchanged pursuant to deadlines and 
requirements imposed by rules of court and civil procedure.5 
Judge Brian, in ruling to exclude the witness, specifically found that Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure require that a party considering calling an expert witness at trial give 
"timely" notice of the expert and their testimony to opposing counsel. (Tr. 84). In 
addition, the Court found that the expert was not divulged to opposing counsel until about 
24 hours before trial and that prejudice would occur if the expert was allowed to testify. 
(Tr. 84). Specifically, the Court found that Mary Rehn would prejudiced because they 
would be unable to "consult with a counter-expert, and discuss the anticipated testimony 
and to obtain a counter-expert to testify" with 24 hours. (Tr. 84-85). The only other 
alternative for Ms. Rehn was to continue the matter for another five months.6 (Tr. 81-83). 
5
 The July 3, 1997, Scheduling Order specifically requires discovery and the exchange of 
exhibits and witness lists to be completed by "(as per rules)." The July 16, 1997, Scheduling 
Order requires the parties to "(see prior notice)." 
6
 In speaking with the court clerk, Mr. Christensen was informed that the next date for 
which the trial could be set was January 13, 1998, a full five months from the scheduled date of 
August 14, 1997. (Tr. 80). 
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Mr. Cathcart will admit that he considered continuing the matter for two or, possibly, three 
months. However, to continue this matter another five months, when it had already been 
pending 18 months, where there was a real financial need on the part of Ms. Rehn (not to 
mention the need bring closure to the matter), was simply too prejudicial to Ms. Rehn, 
particularly in light of Mr. Christensen's admission that the failure to obtain the expert 
was his responsibility. 
Legal Analysis Relating to Appellant's Point 2 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require a party in a civil matter to disclose every 
person the party expects to call as an expert witness at trial and the subject matter of the 
expert's testimony, when requested to do so in the opposing party's interrogatories. See 
Utah R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4). The rules further require that a party "seasonably" supplement 
his or her responses to an opposing party's interrogatories to include "the identity of each 
person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial." Utah R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1)(B). In 
addition to these requirements, the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires "all 
discovery proceedings shall be completed, including all responses thereto, . . . no later 
than thirty (30) days before the date set for trial of the case." Utah Code Jud.Admin. Rule 
4-502. The rule further requires that any discovery conducted within the thirty (30) day 
period prior to trial, to be by motion of the party seeking to conduct discovery (or amend 
their responses) and shall be at the discretion of the trial court. Ibid. The rule further 
states: 
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In exercising its discretion, the court shall take into consideration the necessity 
and reasons for such discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of the parties 
seeking discovery, whether permitting such discovery will prevent the case 
from going to trial on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to any party. 
Utah Code of Jud. Admin. Rule 4-502 (5). 
The Utah Court of Appeals also long recognized this broad discretion given to trial 
courts to manage discovery in the cases pending before them. Berrett v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Western R. R., 830 P.2d 291,293 (Utah.Ct.App. 1992); Maoris & Associates, Inc. 
v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 941 P.2d 636, 642 (Utah.Ct.App. 1997). Furthermore, a trial 
court has the discretion and power to sanction a party for failing to comply with an order 
issued as the result of a discovery conference, including the power to exclude a witness 
from testifying. See Utah R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2); Macris & Associates, Inc., 941 P.2d at 642; 
Berrett, 830 P.2d at 293-294. On appeal, any exercise of this discretion by the trial court 
will not be interfered with unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Berrett, 830 P.2d 
at 293; Marcis & Associates, Inc., 941 P.2d at 642. 
Charles Rehn, in support of his second issued raised on appeal, argues that the trial 
court abused its discretion in excluding the expert witness because none of the scheduling 
orders required witnesses be disclosed by a "certain deadline." (Appellant's Brief, 25). 
In support of this proposition, Appellant cites to Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande 
Western R.R. Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 296 (Utah App. 1992), which held that "absent an 
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order creating a judicially imposed deadline, a trial court may not sanction a party by 
excluding its witness under rule 37(b)(2)." In Berrett, the plaintiff disclosed an expert 
witness 14 days before trial and before a deadline which had been imposed by the 
defendant. Berrett, 830 P.2d at 293. The defendant, in moving to exclude the witness, 
argued that despite his deadline, the plaintiffs expert should be excluded because 
disclosure did not meet the trial court's earlier, more generalized, deadline.7 The Utah 
Court of Appeals held the trial court abused its discretion by excluding an expert witness 
under rule 37(b)(2) where there was no order creating a judicially imposed deadline for 
disclosing witness lists. Ibid, at 296. In reaching its decision in Berrett, the Court of 
Appeals noted the fact there was never a scheduling order in place, that the defense 
counsel had previously proposed a pre-trial order which would require disclosure within 
10 days of trial, and defense counsel's own conduct (by requiring disclosure at a later 
date) contradicted their argument for an earlier disclosure date. Ibid, at 294-196. This 
case presently before the Court of Appeals is factually distinguishable from the Berrett 
case. In Berrett, the plaintiff had never disclosed a witness list to the defendant, and the 
defendant has notice that there were witnesses to be called of which he had no knowledge. 
7
 Defendant, in Berrett relied upon the follow statement by the trial court: 
"So I'm going to direct that whatever motions you are going to file that, either to compel 
[discovery] or any purpose, that we ought to have those filed no later than ten days from 
today [June 27th]." Berrett, 830 P.2d at 295. 
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Defense counsel, in Berrett, was continually aware that he needed to obtain a list of 
witnesses, including experts, who would be testifying at the trial. In the present case, Mr. 
Christensen, in answering Mr. Cathcart's interrogatories, had submitted to Mr. Cathcart 
a list of witnesses including only Charles Rehn and a certified public accountant. (Tr. 82-
83). There was never any discussion and Mr. Cathcart had no idea that Mr. Christensen 
was planning to call another witness. (Tr. 83). The fax that he received in his office at 
7:30 a.m. the day before trial was Mr. Cathcart's first notice that another witness was 
going to be called. 
Furthermore, Mr. Christensen did not give 23, 14, or even 10 days notice that he 
was going to call a 'Vocational expert." Instead, Mr. Cathcart received notice at 7:30 a.m. 
the day before trial. (Tr. 80-81).8 Ms. Rehn respectfully asks this Court to note that there 
were four scheduling orders in the present case, as opposed to none in Berrett, and the last 
two required an exchange of witness lists and a completion of discovery pursuant to the 
court rules and the rules of civil procedure. Pursuant to those rules, Mr. Christensen was 
required to complete discovery, including supplementing his answers to interrogatories, 
within 30 days prior to trial and the failure to do so placed him squarely within the trial 
court's discretion to exclude any further evidence his responses might disclose. Mr. 
8
 In addition to the 14 days disclosure given in the Berrett case, the Court of Appeals, in 
rendering its decision in Berrett, appears to have relied on cases where the disclosure took place 
at least several days before trial. See e.g. Pratt v. Stein, 444 A.2d 674 (Pa.Sup. 1982) (disclosure 
took place 23 days before trial). 
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Christensen, by signing his interrogatories on June 20, 1997, appeared to have complied 
with these disclosure requirements. There was no reason for Mr. Cathcart or Mr. 
Christensen to expect that a trial judge bound by these rules would allow either party to 
supplement their responses to include another witness, particularly an expert witness. 
Despite these significant factual differences, Charles Rehn argues that his eleventh 
hour amendment of his witness list to include the "vocational expert" fits within the 
parameters of this Court's Berrett decision and that the trial court's excluding his witness 
from testifying at the trial the next day was an abuse of discretion based upon the holding 
in Berrett. Appellee respectfully argues that such an interpretation of Berrett is ludicrous. 
Under such an interpretation, a court could require the parties to conform to the rules of 
civil procedure, rules of judicial administration, and local rules, and unless a specific ~ 
exact — date is given for supplementing or amending discovery requests and witness lists, 
a party could add an additional expert to the list a hour before trial if they so desired. 
Furthermore, the trial court, Mr. Rehn seems to argue, would have to either allow the 
witness to testify at the extreme prejudice of the other party or continue the matter to a 
later date. With due respect to this Court and Mr. Rehn, such an extension of the holding 
in Berrett would subject attorneys and their clients to the very kind of evidentiary sabotage 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration seek to 
prevent. 
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For these reasons, Ms. Rehn argues that the exclusion of the "vocational" expert 
was proper and not an abuse of discretion by trial court, based on Mr. Christensen's 
eleventh hour notice to Mr. Cathcart his prior knowledge that the issue of Ms. Rehn's 
earning capacity would be an issue at the trial, and his blatant admission that the 
responsibility for obtaining this witness was his alone. 
CONCLUSION 
In regards to the first issue raised by Mr. Rehn on appeal, Mary Rehn asks this 
Court to affirm the findings of the trial court relating to alimony, child support, the 
allocation of marital debt, and the award of attorney's fees. Furthermore, Ms. Rehn 
requests this Court affirm the trial court's exclusion of the expert witness. 
Finally, should Ms. Rehn prevail on appeal, she respectfully requests this Court 
grant her an award of her reasonable attorney's fees and costs associated with her appeal. 
"Generally, when the trial court awards fees in a domestic action to the party who then 
substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal." Burt 
v. Burt} 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App.1990); Carouse v. Carouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah 
App. 1991). When an appeal involves multiple issues, the party receiving attorney fees 
below need not prevail on every issue in order to be awarded fees on appeal. Bell v. Bell, 
810 P.2d489,494 (Utah App. 1991); Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah App.1990). 
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Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1998. 
A 
TERRY L. CATHCART 
Attorney for the Plaintiff/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
30-3-1 HUSBAND AND WIFE 56 
Section 
30-3-11.1. 
30-3-11.2. 
30-3-11.3. 
30-3-12. 
30-3-13. 
30-3-13.1. 
30-3-14. 
30-3-14.1. 
30-3-15. 
30-3-15.1. 
30-3-15.2. 
30-3-15.3. 
30-3-15.4. 
30-3-16. 
30-3-16.1. 
30-3-16.2. 
30-3-16.3. 
30-3-16.4. 
30-3-16.5. 
30-3-16.6. 
30-3-16.7. 
30-3-17. 
30-3-17.1. 
30-3-18. 
30-3-19 to 
30-3-32. 
30-3-33. 
30-3-34. 
30-3-35. 
30-3-35.5. 
30-3-36. 
30-3-37. 
30-3-38. 
Family Court Act — Purpose. 
Appointment of counsel for child. 
Mandatory educational course for divorcing 
parents — Purpose — Curriculum — Excep-
tions. 
Courts to exercise family counseling powers. 
Repealed. 
Establishment of family court division of dis-
trict court. 
Repealed. 
Designation of judges — Terms. 
Repealed. 
Appointment of domestic relations counselors, 
family court commissioner, and ass ;e*Qr»ts 
and clerks. 
Repealed. 
Commissioners — Powers. 
Salaries and expenses. 
Repealed. 
Jurisdiction of family court division — Powers. 
Petition for conciliation. 
Contents of petition. 
Procedure upon filing of petition. 
Fees. 
Information not available to public. 
Effect of petition — Pendency of action. 
Power and jurisdiction of judge. 
Proceedings deemed confidential — Written 
evaluation by counselor. 
Waiting period for hearing after filing for di-
vorce — Exemption — Use of counseling and 
education services not to be construed as 
condonation or promotion. 
30-3-31. Repealed. 
Visitation — Intent — Policy — Definitions. 
Advisory guidelines. 
Best interests — Rebuttable presumption. 
Minimum schedule for visitation for children 5 
to 18 years of age. 
Minimum schedule for visitation for children 
under five years of age. 
Special circumstances. 
Relocation. 
Pilot Program for Expedited Visitation En-
forcement. 
30-3-1. P r o c e d u r e — R e s i d e n c e — Grounds. 
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as 
provided by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as 
provided in this chapter. 
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the marriage 
contract between the petitioner and respondent on the 
grounds specified in Subsection (3) in all cases where the 
petitioner or respondent has been an actual and bona fide 
resident of this state and of the county where the action is 
brought, or if members of the armed forces of the United 
States who are not legal residents of this state, where the 
petitioner has been stationed in this state under military 
orders, for three months next prior to the commencement of 
the action. 
(3) Grounds for divorce: 
(a) impotency of the respondent at the time of mar-
riage; 
(b) adultery committed by the respondent subsequent 
to marriage; 
(c) willful desertion of the petitioner by the respondent 
for more than one year; 
(d) willful neglect of the respondent to provide for the 
petitioner the common necessaries of life; 
(e) habitual drunkenness of the respondent; 
(f) conviction of the respondent for a felony; 
(g) cruel t reatment of the petitioner by the respondent 
to the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental 
distress to the petitioner; 
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity; or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately 
under a decree of separate maintenance of any state for 
three consecutive years without cohabitation. 
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)(j) does 
not affect the liability of either party under any provision for 
separate maintenance previously granted. 
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of 
insanity unless: 
(i) the respondent has been adjudged insane by the 
appropriate authorities of this or another state prior 
to the commencement of the action; and 
(ii) the court finds by the testimony of competent 
witnesses that the insanity of the respondent is 
incurable, 
(bj The court shall appoint for the respondent a guard-
ian ad litem who shall protect the interests of the respon-
dent. A copy of the summons and complaint shall be 
served on the respondent in person or by publication, as 
provided by the laws of this s tate in other actions for 
divorce, or upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the 
county attorney for the county where the action is pros-
ecuted. 
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the merits of 
the case and if the respondent resides out of this state, 
take depositions as necessary, at tend the proceedings, and 
make a defense as is jus t to protect the rights of the 
respondent and the interests of the state. 
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction 
over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, 
and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as 
the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce. 
(e) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent 
resides in this state, upon notice, have the respondent 
brought into the court at trial, or have an examination of 
the respondent by two or more competent physicians, to 
determine the mental condition of the respondent. For 
this purpose either party may have leave from the court to 
enter any asylum or institution where the respondent 
may be confined. The costs of court in this action shall be 
apportioned by the court. 1997 
30*3-2. Right of husband to divorce . 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife 
for the same causes and in the same manner as the wife may 
obtain a divorce from her husband. 195S 
30-3-3. Award of costs , a t torney and wi tnes s fees — 
Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and 
in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child 
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, 
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and 
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party 
to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The 
order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the 
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no 
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party 
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. jmpecunious or enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may 
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the 
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other 
D a r ty and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the 
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of 
the action or in the final order or judgment. 1993 
30-3-4* P l e a d i n g s — F i n d i n g s — D e c r e e — Use of affi-
d a v i t — Sea l ing . 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the 
petitioner or petitioner's attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default 
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the 
cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the 
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be sub-
mitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the ap-
proval of the court. 
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or 
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both 
parties have attended the mandatory course described in 
Section 30-3-11.3, and have presented a certificate of 
course completion to the court. The court may waive this 
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of 
the parties, if it determines course at tendance and 
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in 
the best interest of the parties. 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held 
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by 
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The 
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter 
the decTee upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree 
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's 
affidavit. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by 
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed 
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order 
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or 
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office 
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied 
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full 
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to 
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 1997 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. R e p e a l e d . 1990 
30-3-5. D i spos i t i on of p r o p e r t y — M a i n t e n a n c e and 
h e a l t h c a r e of p a r t i e s a n d c h i l d r e n — Divi-
s ion of d e b t s — C o u r t t o h a v e c o n t i n u i n g 
j u r i s d i c t i o n — C u s t o d y a n d v i s i t a t i o n — De-
t e r m i n a t i o n of a l i m o n y — N o n m e r i t o r i o u s pe -
t i t i on for modi f ica t ion . 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance 
for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respec-
tive creditors or obligees, regarding the court's divi-
sion of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding 
the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance 
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an order 
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subse-
quent changes or new orders for the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and 
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grand-
parents, and other members of the immediate family, the 
court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for 
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an 
order establishing a visitation schedule a provision, 
among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under 
this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visita-
tion provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court 
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in tha t action, if the court 
determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a 
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member 
of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where 
a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the 
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing 
party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise 
court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following fac-
tors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipi-
ent spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the 
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in 
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base ali-
mony on the standard of living tha t existed at the time of 
trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, 
at tempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living. 
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(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the 
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the 
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change 
shall be considered in dividing the marital property and 
in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the 
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may 
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short 
duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived 
or born during the marriage, the court may consider 
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
substantive changes and new orders regarding ali-
mony based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a 
new order for alimony to address needs of the recipi-
ent that did not exist at the time the decree was 
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any 
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be consid-
ered, except as provided in this subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent 
spouse's financial ability to share living ex-
penses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a 
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the 
payor's improper conduct justifies that consider-
ation. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer 
than the number of years that the marriage existed 
unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the 
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides other-
wise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage 
of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled 
and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall 
resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the 
action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party 
paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with 
another person. 1997 
30-3-5.1. Prov i s ion for income wi thho ld ing in chi ld 
support order. 
Whenever a court enters an order for child support, it shall 
include in the order a provision for withholding income as a 
means of collecting child support as provided in Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 1997 
30-3-5.2. Al legat ions of chi ld abuse or chi ld sexual 
abuse — Invest igat ion. 
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for 
modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of child abuse or 
child sexual abuse is made, implicating either party, the court 
shall order that an investigation be conducted by the Division 
of Child and Family Services within the Department of 
Human Services in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 4a. A 
final award of custody or visitation may not be rendered until 
a report on that investigation is received by the court. That 
investigation shall be conducted by the Division of Child and 
Family Services within 30 days of the court's notice and 
request for an investigation. In reviewing this report, the 
court shall comply with Section 78-7-9. 1996 
30-3-5.5,30-3-6. Repealed . I99iv 1998 
30-3-7. When decree b e c o m e s absolute . 
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute: 
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by 
the clerk in the register of actions if both the parties who 
have a child or children have completed attendance at the 
mandatory course for divorcing parents as provided in 
Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court waives the require-
ment, on its own motion or on the motion of one of the 
parties, upon determination that course attendance and 
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in 
the best interest of the parties; 
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court may 
specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceed-
ings for review are pending; or 
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes absolute, 
for sufficient cause otherwise orders. 
(2) The court, upon application or on its own motion for 
good cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a designated 
period of time before the decree becomes absolute, but not to 
exceed six months from the signing and entry of the decree. 
1994 
30-3-8. Remarr iage — When unlawful . 
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their 
marriage by decree may marry any person other than the 
spouse from whom the divorce was granted until it becomes 
absolute. If an appeal is taken, the divorce is not absolute until 
after affirmance of the decree. 1988 
30-3-9. Repea led . 1969 
30-3-10. Custody of ch i ldren in case of separat ion or 
d ivorce — Custody cons iderat ion . 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are sepa-
rated, or their marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court 
shall make an order for the future care and custody of the 
minor children as it considers appropriate. In determining 
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child 
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of 
each of the parties. The court may inquire-of the children and 
take into consideration the children's desires regarding the 
future custody, but the expressed desires are not controlling 
and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among 
other factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most 
likely to act in the best interests of the child, including 
allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the 
noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody 
of the child, or has attempted to permanently relinquish 
custody to a third party, it shall take that evidence into 
consideration in determining whether to award custody to the 
other parent. 
(4) (a) A court may not discriminate against a parent due 
to a disability, as defined in Section 57-21-2, in awarding 
custody or determining whether a substantial change has 
occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody. 
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in 
awarding custody or determining whether a substantial 
change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an 
award of custody, the parent with a disability may rebut 
any evidence, presumption, or inference arising therefrom 
by showing that: 
(i) the disability does not significantly or substan-
tially inhibit the parent's ability to provide for the 
physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; or 
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(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
iding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
ideals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
\ppeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
;$.2a-3. Court of Appea l s jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
J3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
joe vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
^ r t for original appellate review and determination any 
letter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
^ d i c t i o n . 
'*) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
^ i *n its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 1996 
2a-4. Rev iew of act ions by Supreme Court. 
Keview of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
v^Peals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
^Preme Court. 1986 
78-2a-5. Locat ion of Court of Appeals . 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location within the state. 1986 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals. 
78-3-5. Repealed. 
78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative System. 
78-3-12. Repealed. 
78-3-12.5. Costs of system. 
78-3-13. Repealed. 
78-3-13.4. Transfer of court operating responsibilities — 
Facilities — Staff — Budget. 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. 
78-3-14.2. District court case management. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures. 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed. 
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to counties. 
78-3-18. Judicial Administration Act — Short title. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
78-3-20. Definitions. 
78-3-21. Judicial Council — Creation — Members — 
Terms and election — Responsibilities — 
Reports. 
78-3-21.5. Data bases for judicial boards. 
78-3-22. Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties. 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Appointment — 
Qualifications — Salary. 
78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, duties, and 
responsibilities. 
78-3-25. Assistants for administrator of the courts — 
Appointment of trial court executives. 
78-3-26. Courts to provide information and statistical 
data to administrator of the courts. 
78-3-27. Annual judicial conference. 
78-3-28. Repealed. 
78-3-29. Presiding judge —Associate presiding judge — 
Election — Term — Compensation — Powers 
— Duties. 
78-3-30. Duties of the clerk of the district court. 
78-3-31. Court commissioners — Qualifications — Ap-
pointment — Functions governed by rule. 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed . 1971, 1981, 1988 
78-3-3. Term of j u d g e s — Vacancy. 
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office forjudges of the district courts is six years, and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. 1988 
78-3-4. Jur i sd ic t ion — Appeals . 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and 
not prohibited by law. 
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requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or 
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be 
given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of 
the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed 
extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to 
signify whether they consider the representation fair and 
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or 
otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on 
the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that 
the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations 
as to representation of absent persons, and that the action 
proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural mat-
ters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 
16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from 
time to time. 
(e) Dismissal or compromise . A class action shall not be 
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, 
and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be 
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court 
directs. 
Rule 23.1. Derivat ive act ions by shareholders . 
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders 
or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an 
unincorporated association, the corporation or association 
having failed to enforce a right which may properly be 
asserted by it, the complainant shall be verified and shall 
allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at 
the time of the transaction of which he complains or tha t his 
share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation 
of law, and (2) tha t the action is not a collusive one to confer 
jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not 
otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particu-
larity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the 
action he desires from the directors or comparable authority 
and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the 
reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making 
the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it 
appears tha t the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately 
represent the interests of the shareholders or members simi-
larly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or 
association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised 
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed 
dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or 
members in such manner as the court directs. 
Rule 24. Intervent ion. 
(a) Intervent ion of right. Upon timely application anyone 
shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a s ta tu te 
confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the 
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or t rans-
action which is the subject of the action and he is so situated 
tha t the disposition of the action may as a practical mat te r 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the 
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing 
parties. 
(b) Permiss ive intervent ion. Upon timely application 
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a 
s ta tu te confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an 
applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a 
question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action 
relies for ground of claim or defense upon any s ta tu te or 
executive order administered by a governmental officer or 
agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agree-
ment issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive 
order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be 
permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discre-
tion the court shall consider whether the intervention will 
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the 
original parties. 
(c) Procedure . A person desiring to intervene shall serve a 
motion to intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. 
The motions shall s tate the grounds therefor and shall be 
accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense 
for which intervention is sought. 
(Amended effective Jan . 1, 1987.) 
Rule 25. Subst i tut ion of part ies . 
(a) Death . 
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extin-
guished, the court may order substitution of the proper 
parties. The motion for substitution may be made by any 
party or by the successors or representatives of the 
deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing, 
shall be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and 
upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 
4 for the service of a summons. Unless the motion for 
substitution is made not later than ninety days after the 
death is suggested upon the record by service of a state-
ment of the fact of the death as provided herein for the 
service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to 
the deceased party. 
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of the 
plaintiffs or of one or more of the defendants in an action 
in which the right sought to be enforced survives only to 
the surviving plaintiffs or only against the surviving 
defendants, the action does not abate. The death shall be 
suggested upon the record and the action shall proceed in 
favor of or against the surviving parties. 
(b) Incompetency. If a party becomes incompetent, the 
court upon motion served as provided in Subdivision (a) of this 
rule may allow the action to be continued by or against his 
representative. 
(c) Transfer of interest . In case of any transfer of interest, 
the action may be continued by or against the original party, 
unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the 
interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined 
with the original party. Service of the motion shall be made as 
provided in Subdivision (a) of this rule. 
(d) Pub l i c officers; death or separat ion from office. 
When a public officer is a party to an action and during its 
pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the 
action may be continued and maintained by or against his 
successor, if within 6 months after the successor takes office, it 
is satisfactorily shown to the court that" there is a substantial 
need for so continuing and maintaining it. Substitution pur-
suant to this rule may be made when it is shown by supple-
mental pleading tha t the successor of an officer adopts or 
continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his 
predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer 
to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be 
given reasonable notice of the application therefor and ac-
corded an opportunity to object. 
PARTV. 
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY. 
Rule 26. General provis ions govern ing discovery. 
(a) Di scovery methods . Part ies may obtain discovery by 
one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral 
examination or written questions; written interrogatories; 
production of documents or things or permission to enter upon 
land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; 
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admis-
sion. 
(b) D i scovery scope and l imits . Unless otherwise limited 
by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope 
of discovery is as follows: 
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(1) In general . Part ies may obtain discovery regarding 
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates 
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to 
the claim or defense of any other party, including the 
existence, description, nature , custody, condition, and 
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things 
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge 
of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection 
that the information sought will be inadmissible at the 
trial if the information sought appears reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods 
set forth in Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if 
it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreason-
ably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some 
other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or 
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had 
ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the 
information sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly bur-
densome or expensive, taking into account the needs of 
the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the 
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at 
stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own 
initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion 
under Subdivision (c). 
(2) Insurance agreements . A party may obtain dis-
covery of the existence and contents of any insurance 
agreement under which any person carrying on an insur-
ance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a 
judgment which may be entered in the action or to 
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the 
judgment. Information concerning the insurance agree-
ment is not by reason of disclosure admissible in evidence 
at trial. For purposes of this paragraph, an application for 
insurance shall not be treated as par t of an insurance 
agreement. 
(3) Trial preparat ion: Materials . Subject to the pro-
visions of Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may 
obtain discovery of documents and tangible things other-
wise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for 
another party or by or for tha t other party's representa-
tive (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemni-
tor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing tha t the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in 
the preparation of his case and tha t he is unable without 
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of 
the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of 
such materials when the required showing has been 
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theo-
ries of an attorney or other representative of a party 
concerning the litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a 
statement concerning the action or its subject matter 
previously made by tha t party. Upon request, a person not 
a party may obtain without the required showing a 
statement concerning the action or its subject matter 
previously made by tha t person. If the request is refused, 
the person may move for a court order. The provisions of 
Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in 
relation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a 
statement previously made is (A) a writ ten statement 
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person 
making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or 
other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a 
substantially verbatim recital of an oral s ta tement by the 
person making it and contemporaneously recorded. 
(4) Trial preparat ion: Experts . Discovery of facts 
known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discover-
able under the provisions of Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule 
and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or 
for trial, may be obtained only as follows: 
(A) (i) A party may through interrogatories re-
quire any other party to identify each person 
whom the other party expects to call as an expert 
witness at trial, to s tate the subject matter on 
which the expert is expected to testify, and to 
s tate the substance of the facts and opinions to 
which the expert is expected to testify and a 
summary of the grounds for each opinion. 
(ii) Upon motion, the court may order further 
discovery by other means, subject to such restric-
tions as to scope and such provisions, pursuant to 
Subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees 
and expenses as the court may deem appropriate. 
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions 
held by an expert who has been retained or specially 
employed by another party in anticipation of litiga-
tion or preparation for trial and who is not expected 
to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in 
Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circum-
stances under which it is impracticable for the party 
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the 
same subject by other means. 
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(i) The court shall require that the party seek-
ing discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for 
time spent in responding to discovery under 
Subdivisions (b)(4XA)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this 
rule; and 
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under 
Subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court may 
require, and with respect to discovery obtained 
under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the court 
shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay 
the other party a fair portion of the fees and 
expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party 
in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert. 
(c) Protect ive orders . Upon motion by a party or by the 
person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause 
shown, the court in which the action is pending or alterna-
tively, on mat ters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any 
order which justice requires to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense, including one or more of the following: 
(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified 
terms and conditions, including a designation of the time 
or place; 
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of 
discovery other than tha t selected by the party seeking 
discovery; 
(4) tha t certain mat ters not be inquired into, or that the 
scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(5) tha t discovery be conducted with no one present 
except persons designated by the court; 
(6) tha t a deposition after being sealed be opened only 
by order of the court; 
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, 
development, or commercial information not be disclosed 
or be disclosed only in a designated way; 
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified docu-
ments or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be 
opened as directed by the court. 
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If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in 
part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, 
order tha t any party or person provide or permit discovery. 
The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses 
incurred in relation to the motion. 
(d) Sequence and t iming of discovery. Unless the court 
upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and 
in the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of dis-
covery may be used in any sequence and the fact tha t a party 
is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, 
shall not operate to delay any other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementat ion of responses . A party who has 
responded to a request for discovery with a response that was 
complete when made is under no duty to supplement his 
response to include information thereafter acquired, except as 
follows: 
( D A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement 
his response with respect to any question directly ad-
dressed to (A) the identity and location of persons having 
knowledge of discoverable matters , and (B) the identity of 
each person expected to be called as an expert witness at 
trial, the subject matter on which he is expected to testify, 
and the substance of his testimony. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior 
response if he obtains information upon the basis of which 
(A) he knows that the response was incorrect when made, 
or (B) he knows that the response though correct when 
made is no longer true and the circumstances are such 
that a failure to amend the response is in substance a 
knowing concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by 
order of the court, agreement of the parties, or at any time 
prior to trial through new requests for supplementation of 
prior responses. 
(f) Discovery conference. At any time after commence-
ment of an action, the court may direct the attorneys for the 
parties to appear before it for a conference on the subject of 
discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by the attorney 
for any party if the motion includes: 
(1) a statement of the issues as they then appear; 
(2) a proposed plan and schedule of discovery; 
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery; 
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; 
and 
(5) a statement showing tha t the attorney making the 
motion has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement 
with opposing attorneys on the mat te rs set forth in the 
motion. Each party and his attorney are under a duty to 
participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan 
if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice 
of the motion shall be served on all part ies. Objections or 
additions to matters set forth in the motion shall be 
served not later than ten days after service of the motion. 
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an 
order tentatively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, 
establishing a plan and schedule for discovery, setting limita-
tions on discovery, if any, and determining such other matters , 
including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary for the 
proper management of discovery in the action. An order may 
be altered or amended whenever justice so requires. 
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a 
discovery conference to prompt convening of the conference, 
the court may combine the discovery conference with a pre-
trial conference authorized by Rule 16. 
(g) S igning of discovery requests , r e sponses , and ob-
ject ions . Every request for discovery or response or objection 
thereto made by a party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual 
name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not 
represented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or 
objection and state his address. The signature of the attorney 
or party constitutes a certification tha t he has read the 
request, response, or objection and tha t to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of Utigation; and (3) 
not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given 
the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, 
the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at 
stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection is 
not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly 
after the omission is called to the attention of the party 
making the request, response, or objection, and a party shall 
not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is 
signed. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, 
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the 
person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf 
the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an 
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the 
violation, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
(h) Depos i t ion w h e r e ac t ion p e n d i n g in another 
state. Any par ty to an action or proceeding in another state 
may take the deposition of any person within this state, in the 
same manner and subject to the same conditions and limita-
tions as if such action or proceeding were pending in this state, 
provided tha t in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the 
taking of such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the 
court of the county in which the person whose deposition is to 
be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that 
all mat ters arising during the taking of such deposition which 
by the rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be 
submitted to the court in the county where the deposition is 
being taken. 
(Amended effective Jan . 1, 1987.) 
Rule 27. Depos i t ions before ac t ion or p e n d i n g appeal. 
(a) Before act ion. 
(1) Pet i t ion . A person who desires to perpetuate his 
own testimony or tha t of another person regarding any 
mat ter tha t may be cognizable in any court of this state 
may file a verified petition in the district court of the 
county in which any expected adverse party may reside. 
The petition shall be entitled in the name of the 
petitioner and shall show: (1) tha t the petitioner expects 
to be a party to an action cognizable in a court of this state 
but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be 
brought, (2) the subject mat te r of the expected action and 
his interest therein, (3) the facts which he desires to 
establish by the proposed testimony and his reasons for 
desiring to perpetuate it, (4) the names or a description of 
the persons he expects will be adverse parties and their 
addresses so far as known, and (5) the names and ad-
dresses of the persons to be examined and the substance 
of the testimony which he expects to elicit from each, and 
shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to take 
the depositions of the persons to be examined named in 
the petition, for the purpose of perpetuat ing their testi-
mony. 
(2) Not i ce and serv ice . The petitioner shall thereaf-
ter serve a notice upon each person named in the petition 
as an expected adverse party, together with a copy of the 
petition, stat ing tha t the petitioner will apply to the court, 
at a time and place named therein, for the order described 
in the petition. At least 20 days before the date of hearing 
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him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. Any 
admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose 
of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for 
any other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other 
proceeding. 
(Amended effective Jan . 1, 1987.) 
Rule 37. Fai lure to make or cooperate in discovery; 
sanct ions . 
(a) Motion for order compel l ing discovery. A party, 
upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons af-
fected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as 
follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to 
a party may be made to the court in which the action is 
pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the 
court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
An application for an order to a deponent who is not a 
party shall be made to the court in the district where the 
deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question 
propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a 
corporation or other entity fails to make a designation 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an 
interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 
34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as 
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the 
discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspec-
tion in accordance with the request. When taking a 
deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the 
question may complete or adjourn the examination before 
he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may 
make such protective order as it would have been empow-
ered to make on a motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of 
this subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be 
treated as a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of mot ion . If the motion is 
granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated 
the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct 
or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable 
expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attor-
ney fees, unless the court finds tha t the opposition to the 
motion was substantially justified or tha t other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportu-
nity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney 
advising the motion or both of them to pay to the party or 
deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in opposing the motion, including attor-
ney fees, unless the court finds tha t the making of the 
motion was substantially justified or tha t other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part , the 
court may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in 
relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a 
jus t manner. 
(b) Fai lure to comply wi th order. 
(1) Sanct ions by court in district w h e r e deposi -
t ion is taken. If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer 
a question after being directed to do so by the court in the 
district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure 
may be considered a contempt of tha t court. 
(2) Sanct ions by court in w h i c h act ion is pending . 
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a 
party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) 
to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to 
provide or permit discovery, including an order made 
under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party 
fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), the court 
in which the action is pending may make such orders in 
regard to the failure as are just , and among others the 
following: 
(A) an order tha t the mat te rs regarding which the 
order was made or any other designated facts shall be 
taken to be established for the purposes of the action 
in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining 
the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient 
party to support or oppose designated claims or 
defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing desig-
nated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts 
thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is 
obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any 
par t thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in 
addition thereto, an order t reat ing as a contempt of 
court the failure to obey any orders except an order to 
submit to a physical or mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an 
order under Rule 35(a) requiring him to produce 
another for examination, such orders as are listed in 
Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, 
unless the party failing to comply shows that he is 
unable to produce such person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition 
thereto, the court shall require the par ty failing to obey 
the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by 
the failure, unless the court finds tha t the failure was 
substantially justified or t ha t other circumstances make 
an award of expenses unjust. 
(c) E x p e n s e s on failure to admit . If a party fails to admit 
the genuineness of any document or the t ru th of any matter as 
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the 
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document 
or the t r u th of the matter, he may apply to the court for an 
order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable 
expenses incurred in making tha t proof, including reasonable 
attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds 
t h a t (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 
36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial 
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable 
ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) 
there was other good reason for the failure to admit. 
(d) Fa i lure of party to a t tend at o w n depos i t ion or 
s erve a n s w e r s to interrogator ies or respond to request 
for inspec t ion . If a party or an officer, director, or managing 
agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 
31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the 
officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a 
proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to inter-
rogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the 
interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request 
for inspection submitted under Rule 34. after proper service of 
the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion 
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and 
among others it may take any action authorized under Para-
graphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu 
of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the 
party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by 
the failure, unless the court finds tha t the failure was sub-
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gtantially justified or tha t other circumstances make an award 
of expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be 
excused on the ground tha t the discovery sought is objection-
able unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective 
order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Fai lure to part ic ipate in the framing of a discov-
ery plan. If a party or his attorney fails to participate in good 
faith in the framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is 
required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for 
hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other 
party the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused 
by the failure. 
(Amended effective Jan . 1, 1987.) 
PART VI. 
TRIALS. 
Rule 38. Jury trial of right. 
(a) Right preserved . The right of trial by jury as declared 
by the constitution or as given by s ta tute shall be preserved to 
the parties. 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any 
issue triable of right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee 
and serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in 
writing at any time after the commencement of the action and 
not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading 
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a 
pleading of the party. 
(c) Same: Specif icat ion of i s sues . In his demand a party 
may specify the issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he 
shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all the 
issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for only 
some of the issues, any other party, within 10 days after 
service of the demand or such lesser time as the court may 
order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any other or all 
of the issues of fact in the action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, 
to serve a demand as required by this rule and to file it as 
required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by 
jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may 
not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties. 
(Amended effective Jan . 1, 1987.) 
Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court . 
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as 
provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the 
register of actions as a jury action. The trial of all issues so 
demanded shall be by jury, unless 
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written 
stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation 
made in open court and entered in the record, consent to 
trial by the court sitt ing without a jury, or 
(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds 
that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues 
does not exist, or 
(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial. 
(b) By the court . Issues not demanded for trial by jury as 
provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwith-
standing the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in 
which such a demand might have been made of right, the court 
HI its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any 
°r all issues. 
(c) Advisory jury a n d trial by consent . In all actions not 
friable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own 
mitiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, with the 
consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose 
verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a mat ter 
°f right. 
Rule 40. Ass ignment of cases for trial; continuance. 
(a) Order and precedence . The district courts shall pro-
vide by rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar 
(1) without request of the parties or (2) upon request of a party 
and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner as 
the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to 
actions entitled thereto by statute. 
(b) P o s t p o n e m e n t of the trial. Upon motion of a party, 
the court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be 
just , including the payment of costs occasioned by such post-
ponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence 
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of 
the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that due 
diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also 
require the party seeking the continuance to state, upon 
affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and 
if the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence 
would be given, and tha t it may be considered as actually 
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the 
trial shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
(c) Taking t e s t imony of w i t n e s s e s p r e s e n t . If required 
by the adverse party, the court shall, as a condition to such 
postponement, proceed to have the testimony of any witness 
present taken, in the same manner as if at the trial; and the 
testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same 
effect, and subject to the same objections that may be made 
with respect to a deposition under the provisions of Rule 
32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and (B)]. 
Rule 41. Dismissa l of act ions . 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by st ipulat ion. Subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable 
statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff 
without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at 
any time before service by the adverse party of an answer 
or of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a 
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have 
appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the 
notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without 
prejudice, except tha t a notice of dismissal operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who 
has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of 
any state an action based on or including the same claim. 
(2) By order of court . Except as provided in Para-
graph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall 
not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon 
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as 
the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been 
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of 
the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be 
dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the 
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adju-
dication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the 
order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without preju-
dice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of 
the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any 
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action 
or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action 
tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presenta-
tion of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to 
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may 
move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the 
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier 
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment 
until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders 
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall 
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(vi) any co-signors or indemnitors that will be 
required; and 
(vii) the conditions under which the bond may be 
exonerated and the collateral returned. 
(6) Disqualification. 
(A) Informal resolution of complaints. Whenever it is 
alleged that a surety has engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, the Board shall notify the surety in writing of the 
allegations. The surety shall respond to the allegations in 
writing within ten days. 
(B) Formal resolution of complaints. If the surety fails 
to respond to the notice provided pursuant to paragraph 
(6)(A), or if the Board determines that formal action is 
necessary, the Board shall require the surety to appear 
before the Board at a time and place certain to respond to 
the allegations. Both the initial notice and the notice of 
formal action shall be served upon the surety by mailing 
the same, via certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the surety's last known address on file with the Board. No 
answer or other responsive pleading is required to the 
notice of formal action. Discovery is prohibited, but the 
Board may request production of documentary evidence. 
All parties to the proceeding shall have access to informa-
tion contained in the file maintained by the Board and to 
all materials and information gathered in any investiga-
tion, to the extent permitted by law. The board shall 
conduct a hearing at the time and place set forth in the 
notice of formal action. The hearing shall be open to all 
parties to the proceeding. The surety may be represented 
by counsel and shall be permitted to testify, present 
evidence, and comment on the allegations. The Board may 
record the hearing, and any party, at its own expense, 
may have a transcriber approved by the Board prepare a 
transcript from the record. Within ten days after the close 
of the hearing, the Board shall issue a written decision 
which may be to continue the surety's qualification with-
out change; to continue the surety's qualification subject 
to such restrictions, limitations or requirements as the 
Board deems appropriate; to suspend the surety's quali-
fication pending compliance with specified criteria; or to 
disqualify the surety. The decision shall be based on the 
facts appearing in the file maintained by the Board and 
the facts presented in evidence at the hearing. The 
decision shall include the reasons therefore, notice of any 
right of review, and the time limit for filing for such a 
review. The decision shall be served upon the surety by 
mailing the same, via first class mail, to the surety's last 
known address on file with the Board. Any party ag-
grieved by the decision of the Board may file a petition for 
judicial review within thirty days after the date of the 
decision. Judicial review shall be governed by the proce-
dures set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15. 
(Repealed and reenacted effective November 15, 1995.) 
Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record. 
Intent: 
lb designate locations of trial courts of record. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are 
hereby designated as locations of trial courts of record: Ameri-
can Fork; Bountiful; Cedar City; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park 
City; Roosevelt; Roy; Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley 
City. 
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, any trial court of 
record may hold court in any location designated by this rule. 
(Added effective January 1, 1992; amended effective Novem-
ber 15, 1995.) I 
Rule 4-408.01. Responsibility for administration of 
trial courts. 
Intent: 
lb designate the court locations administered directly 
through the administrative office of the courts and those 
administered through contract with local government pursu-
ant to § 78-3-21. 
Applicability: [ 
This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record and to the 
administrative office of the courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All locations of the juvenile court shall be administered 
directly through the administrative office of the courts. 
(2) All locations of the district and circuit courts shall be 
admimstered directly through the administrative office of the 
courts, except the following, which shall be administered 
through contract with county or municipal government pur-
suant to § 78-3-21: Beaver, Castle Dale, Coalville, Fillmore, 
Junction, Kanab, Loa, Manila, Manti, Morgan, Panguitch, 
Park City, Randolph, and Salem. 
(Added effective November 15, 1995.) 
ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-501. 
Intent: 
Motions. 
Tb establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, support-
ing memoranda and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and sched-
uling hearings on dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: [ 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district courts 
except proceedings before the court commissioners and small 
claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: I 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All mo-
tions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be 
accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities 
appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page 
number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or . 
other documents relied upon in support of the motion. 
Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of 
material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an 
ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memo-
randum, the application shall state the length of the 
principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in 
excess of ten pages, the application shall include a sum-
mary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The 
responding party shall file and serve upon all parties 
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum 
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in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documen 
tation If the responding party fails to file a memorandum 
in opposition to the motion within ten days after service of 
the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in 
paragraph (l)(d) of this rule 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may 
serve and file a reply memorandum within five days after 
service of the responding party s memorandum 
(d) Not ice to submit for decis ion. Upon the expira-
tion of the five-day period to file a reply memorandum, 
either party may notify the Clerk to submit the matter to 
the court for decision The notification shall be in the form 
of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to 
Submit for Decision" The notification shall contain a 
certificate of mailing to all parties If neither party files a 
notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision 
(2) Mot ions for summary judgment . 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The 
points and authorities in support of a motion for summary 
judgment shall begin with a section tha t contains a 
concise statement of material facts as to which movant 
contends no genuine issue exists The facts shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically 
refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies 
(b) Memorandum in opposi t ion to a motion. The 
points and authorities in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment shall begin with a section that con-
tains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists Each disputed fact 
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon 
which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall 
s tate the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's 
facts tha t are disputed All material facts set forth in the 
movants s tatement and properly supported by an accu-
rate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's s tatement 
(3) Hearings . 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a 
hearing unless ordered by the Court, or requested by the 
parties as provided m paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would 
dispose of the action or any issues in the action on the 
merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the 
principal memorandum m support of or in opposition to a 
motion may file a written request for a hearing 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds 
tha t (a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous 
or (b) tha t the dispositive issue or set of issues governing 
the granting or denial of the motion has been authorita-
tively decided 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court 
shall notify the requesting party When a request for 
hearing is granted, the court shall set the mat ter for 
hearing or notify the requesting party tha t the mat ter 
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the 
mat te r for hearing and notify all parties of the date and 
t ime 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a cour-
tesy copy of the motion, memorandum of points and 
authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the 
motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the mat ter 
at least two working days before the date set for hearing 
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and 
indicate the date and time of the hearing Courtesy copies 
shall not be filed with the clerk of the court 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at th* 
time the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearinp 
on the motion shall be deemed waived 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirtv 
(30) days before the scheduled trial date No dispositive 
motions shall be heard after tha t date without leave of the 
Court 
(4) Expedi ted disposi t ions . Upon motion and notice and 
for good cause shown the court may grant a request for an 
expedited disposition in any case where time is of the essence 
and compliance with the provisions of this rule would be 
impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant 
legal issues and could be resolved summarily 
(5) Te lephone conference. The court on its own motion or 
at a party s request may direct arguments of an} motion b\ 
telephone conference without court appearance A verbatim 
record shall be made of all telephone arguments and the 
rulings thereon if requested by counsel 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990, April 15, 1991, Novem 
ber 1, 1996 ) 
Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civi l cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery docu 
ments 
Tb establish a limitation on discovery procedures within 30 
days of trial 
Applicabil i ty: 
This rule shall apply to the District and Juvenile Courts 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Part ies conducting discovery under Rules 33, 34 and 36 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall not file discoven 
requests with the clerk of the court, but shall file only the 
original certificate of service stating tha t the discovery re-
quests have been served on the other parties and the date of 
service The responding party shall file a similar certificate 
with the clerk of the court 
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall retain the 
original with a copy of the proof of service affixed to it and 
serve a copy of the discovery request and proof of service upon 
the opposing party or counsel The party responding to the 
discovery request shall retain the original with a copy of the 
proof of service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses 
and the proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel 
The discovery requests and response shall not be filed with the 
clerk of the court unless the court on motion and notice and for 
good cause shown so orders 
(3) Any par ty filing a motion to compel compliance with a 
discovery request or a motion which relies upon the discoven 
response shall attach a copy of the discovery request or 
response which is at issue in the motion 
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure shall not be filed with the clerk of the court except as 
provided in this Code or upon order of the court for good cau«e 
shown 
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovers pr°" 
ceedmgs in accordance with this rule All discovery proceed-
ings shall be completed, including all responses thereto and 
all depositions and other documents filed with the court no 
later than thirtv (30) days before the date set for trial of the 
case The right to conduct discovery proceedings within thirt> 
(30) days before trial shall be within the discretion of the 
court Motions to conduct discovery within thirty (30) davs 
before trial shall be presented to the judge assigned to the case 
upon notice to the other parties in the action In exercising * 
discretion, the court shall take into consideration the neces-
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sity and reasons for such discovery, the diligence or lack of 
diligence of the parties seeking such discovery, whether per-
mitting such discovery will prevent the case from going to trial 
on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to any party. 
\fothing herein shall preclude or limit the voluntary exchange 
of information or discovery by stipulation of the parties at any 
mne prior to the date set for trial, but in no event shall such 
exchanges or stipulations require a court to gran t a continu-
ance of the trial date. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; Novem-
ber 1, 1996.) 
Rule 4-503. Reques ts for jury ins truct ions . 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitt ing and re-
questing jury instructions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District and Just ice Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented to the 
court five days prior to the scheduled trial date unless other-
wise ordered by the court. The court, in its discretion, may 
allow the presentation of jury instructions at any time prior to 
the submission of the case to the jury. At the time of presen-
tation to the court, a copy of the requested instructions shall 
be furnished to opposing counsel. 
(2) Jury instruction requests must be in writ ing and state 
in full the instruction requested. Each request shall be upon a 
separate sheet of paper, the original and copies of which shall 
be free from red lines and firm names and shall be entitled: 
"Instruction No. " 
The number of the request shall be written in lead pencil. 
(3) If case citations are used in support of a requested 
instruction, at least one copy of the requested instruction 
furnished to the court shall be submitted without the cita-
tions. Citations may be provided upon separate sheets at-
tached to the particular instruction to which the citation 
applies. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; November 1, 1996.) 
Rule 4-504. Written orders, j u d g m e n t s a n d decrees . 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting writ ten 
orders, judgments, and decrees to the court. This rule is not 
intended to change existing law with respect to the enforce-
ability of unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of 
record except small claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties 
obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a 
shorter time as the court may direct, file with the court a 
proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the 
ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments , and orders 
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented 
to the court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. 
Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and 
counsel within five days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be 
reduced to writing and presented to the court for signature 
within fifteen days of the settlement and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall 
be served upon the opposing party and proof of such service 
shall be filed with the court. All judgments, orders, and 
decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted after 
signature by the judge, including other correspondence requir-
ing a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes 
and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in 
such a manner as to show whether they are entered upon the 
stipulation of counsel, the motion of counsel or upon the 
court's own initiative and shall identify the attorneys of record 
in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or 
decree is made. 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and 
decrees shall contain, if known, the judgment debtor's address 
or last known address and social security number. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate 
documents and shall not include any matters by reference 
unless otherwise directed by the court. Orders not constituting 
judgments or decrees may be made a part of the documents 
containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is 
based. 
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation 
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, 
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and 
filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the record. 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written 
obligation to pay money and a judgment has previously been 
rendered upon the same written obligation, the plaintiff or 
plaintiff's counsel shall attach to the new complaint a copy of 
all previous judgments based upon the same written obliga-
tion. 
(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the 
power of any court, upon a proper showing, to enforce a 
settlement agreement or any other agreement which has not 
been reduced to writing. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15,1991; April 15, 
1995.) I 
Rule 4-505. Attorney fees affidavits. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for 
affidavits in support of attorney fees. 
Applicabil ity: 
This rule shall govern the award of attorney fees in the trial 
courts. I 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must 
be filed with the court and set forth specifically the legal basis 
for the award, the nature of the work performed by the 
attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to 
judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the mat ter to the 
stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the 
reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services. 
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by per-
sons other than attorneys, for time spent, work completed and 
hourly rate billed. 
(3) If the affidavit is in support of attorney fees for services 
rendered to a person or entity who has been assigned an 
interest in a claim for the purpose of collection or hired by the 
obligee to collect a debt, the affidavit shall also state tha t the 
attorney is not sharing the fee or any portion thereof in 
violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4. 
(4) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum 
which it is expected will require considerable additional work 
to collect, the following phrase may be included in the judg-
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Dear Teny: 
I do not believe I have received the last pay stub from my client yet It does show 
a pay increase to $82,000.00 annually. I will try to get that to you tomorrow. 
The last offer was my client's best and last offer. I plan to call the following 
witnesses at trial in addition to the parties: 
L Cory Webster, C.P.A. to testify on tax issues affecting support; and 
2. Jim White, Assistant Director of the Career Services Dept at the University of 
Utah to establish the reasonable income potential for a person with Mary's background. 
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I expect the testimoay of the two experts to each be less than an hour. If you have 
any questions on any of these issues, please call. 
Very truly yours, 
cc: Charlie Rdm 
